INTRODUCTION
Trademark owners regularly overreach. They often threaten or sue people they have no business suing, including satirists, parodists, non-commercial users, and gripe sites. When they do, they often justify their aggressive legal conduct by pointing to the need to protect their trademarks by policing infringement. Courts have in fact indicated at various points that policing is, if not strictly necessary, at least a way to strengthen a mark. But courts have never held that efforts to block speech-related uses are necessary or even helpful in obtaining a strong mark. Several scholars have accordingly argued that overzealous policing is unnecessary, has harmful effects, and ought to be punished. But trademark owners continue to do it, in part because it is largely (though not completely) costless, and because if there is even a chance a failure to police will cost owners their trademark, they won't want to take the chance. So, not only does trademark law currently fail to prevent overreaching, it affirmatively encourages it.
In this Article, I suggest a way that we can align trademark owner enforcement incentives with good public policy. The presence of unauthorized parodies, satires, and complaint sites related to a mark should be evidence of the fame of the mark and perhaps even a requirement for status as a famous mark. Taking this approach would be consistent with what we know about how society interacts with trademarks. Famous marks become part of a social conversation in a way that ordinary marks don't.
1 My approach has empirical support: The best-known brands draw more parodies and criticism sites than non-famous marks, and those parodies don't interfere with the fame of the mark. And my approach would give trademark owners an affirmative reason to leave critics, satirists, and parodists alone.
In Part I, I talk about the problem. In Part II, I talk about how we might solve it and consider some objections.
I. THE TRADEMARK POLICE STATE
Trademark owners regularly overreach. They make extremely broad claims for their marks, trying to control simple shapes, words, or even letters regardless of context or of whether trademark law gives any right over those things. Sometimes these claims are brought against competitors.
2 Other times they are brought against companies in very different product fields who want to use a similar mark or logo. 3 More alarming, trademark owners regularly bring claims against social and political speech that uses their marks in ways they don't like. Trademark owners sue parodists. 4 They sue satirists. 5 They sue gripe sites. 6 They sue competitors who make fun of them 7 and other 4. See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm't 2000 , Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 , 1097 , 1101 (9th Cir. 2008 ) (holding the "Pig Pen" club depicted in the streets of a Grand Theft Audio video game was protected parody of the "Play Pen" club); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003 ) (affirming summary judgment for defendant artist of "Barbie Enchiladas," "Fondue a la Barbie," and other artistic parodies); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding "[t] he parties are advised to chill" in the case of Barbie maker against the record company behind "The Barbie Girl" song); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1996) Rings', LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2018) , https://www.law360.com/articles/1089922 [https://perma.cc/NBD6-D3XY] (reporting a challenge by the owners of the Lord of the Rings trademark against a confectioner who wanted to use "Lord of Meringues" as a trademark); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 4, at 498-500 (discussing cases and the elusive distinction between parody and satire); cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569, 580-81 (1994) (distinguishing parody in a copyright context, which pokes fun at the protected material, from satire, which uses the protected material to poke fun at something else, but noting that both can be protected).
6. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2005 ) (holding no actionable infringement for use of Reverend Jerry Falwell's mark in www.fallwell.com, a noncommercial site critical of Falwell's views on gay people); Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005); TMI, Inc., v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2004 companies who make cultural references to them. 8 They sue movies and TV shows that depict their products in ways they find unflattering.
9 They sue politicians who use their marks in campaign ads and speeches.
10 They sue people who use their trademarks to talk about the plaintiff's own products.
11 They sue people who make posters, T-shirts, and plush toys that evoke their marks, even when it is beyond doubt that it is not the trademark owners who are selling those products. 252, 261, 263 (4th Cir. 2007 ) (holding that a plush "Chewy Vuitton" puppy toy was a non-infringing parody of Louis Vuitton, which succeeded by allowing consumers to "to perceive the target of the Sometimes-too often-the trademark owners win these suits.
13
More often they lose.
14 But even claims that are unlikely to win often have the desired effect of scaring off the users. Defending a trademark case is expensive, the outcome is uncertain, and the payoff is limitedyou get to keep doing what you were already doing. As a result, far too many people and companies with meritorious defenses simply drop their parody, satire, complaint, or commentary rather than face the prospect of litigation. 15 The result is that even though trademark parody, while simultaneously allowing them to recognize the changes to the mark that make the parody funny or biting"); N. REV. 625, 652 (explaining how the costs of rebuffing "trademark bullies" makes "ceasing to use the trademark at stake without a battle" perhaps the least expensive option); William McGeveran, supra note 9, at 52 ("The lethal combination of uncertain standards with lengthy and costly litigation creates a classic chilling effect upon the unlicensed use owners tend to lose most cases against political and social speech, they still end up shutting down quite a bit of socially valuable speech that the law is not intended to target. These efforts likely deter even more protected speech from ever occurring, particularly because trademark owners are aggressively sending threatening cease-and-desist letters even when they don't file suit.
16
When pressed as to why they bring weak trademark claims against protected speech, or even against extremely remote marks, trademark owners frequently fall back on the justification that they have an obligation to police their trademarks against potentially infringing uses.
17 If they don't aggressively enforce their marks, they worry that the value of their marks will be weakened by multiple, conflicting uses. 18 In extreme cases, they worry that they will lose their marks altogether by having courts deem them generic or abandoned or else lose the right to enforce them through laches.
19
It is tempting to dismiss these claims as cynical efforts to justify conduct that is in fact intended to deter and suppress protected speech the trademark owner simply doesn't like. And in many cases, that is probably the explanation. There doesn't seem to be any case punishing a trademark owner for failing to police a mark against the sorts of speech with which I am concerned here. Indeed, I didn't find a single case holding a mark abandoned or otherwise lost solely for failure to police the mark at all. All the cases considering the issue point in the opposite direction. 20 Further, policing alone is generally insufficient to save a mark from becoming generic. 21 Courts have generally considered policing (or lack thereof) as just one piece of evidence when evaluating strength of the mark, likelihood of confusion, genericide, and laches. It is tempting, therefore, to view the whole requirement of trademark policing as a myth, rather like the received 18. Jeremy Sheff refers to this as fear-driven enforcement. Jeremy N. Sheff, Fear and (but inaccurate) wisdom that you shouldn't let your mark be used as a verb for fear that it will be declared generic.
22
But the reality is a bit more complicated. A failure to police can be a factor leading to genericide, even if it is not itself determinative.
23
Policing can influence the scope of protection. Some courts have found trademarks to be stronger because of vigorous efforts to police the mark against infringing uses.
24 On the flip side, a number of courts have found the strength of the mark decreased due to the presence of a number of other, similar marks, and the mark thus entitled to only a narrow scope of protection. 25 While that is not specifically a finding 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1979 ) (reasoning that the fact eighty-five firms using WORLD in carpet retailing and manufacturing "militates against the finding of likelihood of confusion"); Fuel Clothing Co. v. Nike, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 594, 611-13 (D.S.C. 2014) (reasoning that the fact that over 1,000 marks included "Fuel" weakened the strength of plaintiff's mark, and granting summary judgment to defendant on most claims); Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997 ) (finding "Columbia" relatively weak as mark in healthcare that failure to police narrows the scope of a trademark owner's rights, it provides a significant legal incentive to police because failure to do so can allow similar marks to proliferate and cabin the trademark owner's rights.
Further, while policing alone won't prevent a mark from becoming generic, some courts that have rejected claims of genericide have pointed to the absence of competing uses of the mark as a factor, and that absence sometimes results from aggressive enforcement.
26
Policing is also relevant to laches. Courts will not enforce a trademark if the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in filing suit and the defendant is prejudiced as a result.
27 Unreasonable delay is measured from the time of either actual or constructive knowledge of the competing use. 28 The constructive knowledge standard effectively imposes on a trademark owner the duty to be aware of potential infringers, and probably to take some action, because a trademark owner that should have been aware of a use won't avoid laches because of her ignorance. The received wisdom that trademark owners must police infringement of their marks, then, is overstated but contains important kernels of truth. Owners don't have to police their marks. But doing so helps in various ways. Lawyers who advise trademark owners to police aren't wrong, at least not entirely. The issue is gray, not black and white.
II. POLICING PARODIES
The desirability of stopping obvious acts of infringementcounterfeiting or the adoption of the same mark by a direct competitor-does not mean that trademark owners must or should sue anyone who uses their mark or anything like it. And as noted above, overreaching by trademark owners who bring claims against parodists or critics rather than their commercial competitors causes harm to the world. We should discourage such overreach. The question is how.
One obvious response is for courts to make clear that policing one's mark against infringing uses doesn't require policing against non-infringing uses like parody, criticism, non-trademark use, 30 (2007) ("Strictly speaking, trademark infringement should require not only that a defendant be using the mark to promote its own products or services but also that it be using it 'as a mark'-i.e., to indicate the source or sponsorship of those products or services."). requires a court to analyze the similarity of the products in light of the way in which the marks are actually displayed in their purchasing context" because the "Act seeks to eliminate the confusion that is created in the marketplace by the sale of products bearing highly similar marks."); and Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Sols. Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2003 ) ("Because post-domain paths do not typically signify source, it is unlikely that the presence of another's trademark in a post-domain path of a URL would ever violate trademark nominative use of the mark to refer to the trademark owner's own goods. 31 This seems easy, indeed almost tautological: Trademark owners don't have to sue people for things that don't actually violate their rights. I suppose some trademark owners might (wrongly) think such uses are infringing and therefore that they have to pursue parodists and nominative fair users even if they don't want to. But the law already provides that trademark owners are not required to act against every infringing use-acting against the most damaging uses is sufficient. 32 Even if a trademark owner thought a parody was infringing, that infringement would surely not be the core sort the policing requirement is directed against. Parodies, nominative uses, and the like don't pose any of the risks that motivate policing. They won't make a mark generic because they refer back to and therefore strengthen rather than weaken the connection between the mark and its owner. 33 And they won't weaken a mark by crowding the field because they aren't competitive uses. At most, deciding not to sue law."). As an example of a court implicitly rejecting this trademark use doctrine, see Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 151-52, 161-63 (4th Cir. 2012 252, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2007 ) (holding plush "Chewy Vuitton" puppy toys to be a non-infringing parody of bags with Louis Vuitton marks because they allow consumers "to perceive the target of the parody, while simultaneously allowing them to recognize the changes to the mark that make the parody funny or biting"); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 , 1489 -90 (10th Cir. 1987 ) (holding that "it is not likely that public identification of JORDACHE with the plaintiff will be eroded [by defendant's parody "Lardashe"]; indeed, parody tends to increase public identification of a plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff").
non-infringing parodists might raise a laches defense if a trademark owner later decides to sue non-infringing parodists. But so what? They weren't going to win that suit anyway.
34
It can't hurt for courts to make clear that any policing obligation does not extend to efforts to stop non-infringing uses like parodies. But for the reasons just mentioned, trademark owners-at least those advised by savvy counsel-should be unlikely to think they have to sue parodists in order to protect their mark. A more likely explanation is that they want to stop the parodies, either by persuading a court to do so or by using the cost and uncertainty of litigation to drive small users out of business. 35 And if that's their goal, just telling them they don't need to do it won't stop them.
We need better reasons for trademark owners to lay off parodies and other socially beneficial uses of trademarks. Prior scholars have suggested sticks: penalties for frivolous lawsuits or for dubious threat letters, greater fee shifting, declaring the mark expressively generic, and the like. 36 Those are probably good ideas, though they may not protect the people who most need protecting-those who fold up shop in response to a scary-looking cease-and-desist letter because they don't know any better or can't afford to vindicate their rights. L. 259, 262 (1994) (assessing, in the copyright context, approaches to combating wrongful copyright infringement claims through actions based in breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, fraud, and false advertising); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 399; Tang, supra note 13, at 2028-29.
My goal here is to suggest a carrot, not a stick. If we want trademark owners to be motivated not to sue parody and criticism sites, we should make the existence of those sites a good rather than a bad thing for trademark owners. I propose that the law view the existence of parody and criticism of a brand as affirmative evidence that the brand is famous and maybe even treat it as a requirement for fame.
Brands want to be famous. 37 Famous trademarks are strong marks entitled to a broader scope of protection against likely consumer confusion.
38 Further, only famous marks are entitled to extra protection against trademark dilution even in the absence of consumer confusion. 39 Once the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was passed in 1995, many companies sought and were granted famous status for marks that were not actually very famous. 40 Congress raised the standard of fame in the Trademark Dilution Reform Act of 2006. Under that narrowed definition, "a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner." criticism naturally target or employ well-known brands; making fun of a trademark no one has ever heard of seems a bootless enterprise, and a satire based on a meme no one understands won't be very effective. 43 Similarly, companies have a greater need to talk about famous marks in order to compare their goods to the market leader or explain why their products are, say, compatible with Apple's iPhone. And the public as a whole may appropriate a mark for cultural conversation, but it is more likely to do so if the mark is famous and therefore well understood. 44 Further, each of these types of uses reinforces rather than dilutes the significance of the brand in question. A parody or satire only works because people get the joke--because they simultaneously recognize the reference to the brand and understand that the parody is not the brand. 45 The point of nominative fair uses--comparative advertising, discussing your relationship with the branded product, and the like-- S. 569, 586 (1994) (underscoring that "parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works" in a copyright context).
44. Barbie, for instance, has been appropriated by several artists using it as a shorthand to comment on society. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing "Barbie Enchiladas" visual art); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing "The Barbie Girl" song). See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 1 (explaining how trademarks function as "ideograms" and examining the law's difficulty in policing and protecting such uses appropriately).
45. Successful parodies are permitted not least because they do not confuse consumers. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S. A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252, 260-261 (4th Cir. 2007 ) (reasoning "an effective parody will actually diminish the likelihood of confusion" because it enables audiences "to perceive the target of the parody, while simultaneously allowing them to recognize the changes to the mark that make the parody funny or biting"); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987 is to use the trademark to refer not to your own goods but to the trademark owner's. Similarly, trademarks in expressive products are there because the author wants to talk about the trademarks. They too reinforce the semantic connection between the brand and the product it refers to. 46 So it makes sense to think that famous marks are the ones most likely to attract parodies and other speech-related uses and that those uses reinforce rather than dilute the significance of the mark as a referent for the trademark owner's goods in the minds of the public. For both reasons, the presence of parodies and other referential uses surely correlates with fame.
Notably, the most famous brands are also the most likely to sue parodists. I collected data on trademark complaints involving both marks held famous under the 2006 Trademark Dilution Act (TDRA) and marks held not famous under the same statute. 47 Owners of trademarks held famous under the higher TDRA standard filed 562 trademark suits involving those brands between 2007 and 2017. Of those cases, seventeen were brought against uses alleged to be parodies. By contrast, companies owning marks held not famous filed 561 suits involving those marks, none against parodists. But almost all of those suits were filed by one company--Coach, which brought 540 suits. Excluding Coach, other non-famous brands brought only twenty-one lawsuits, none involving parodies.
48
I don't mean to make too much of this data. It includes only the actual marks held famous under the new law, not marks that are surely famous under both laws (e.g., Barbie, Google, and the Louis Vuitton "LV" logo). It excludes cease-and-desist letters that never made it to court and court cases that never made it to decision. And it excludes at least some suits against parodies by marks that are probably famous but whose fame was not in serious question in the case. 49 So one should not conclude from this that people only parody famous marks. 46 . See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 516-17, 525-27, 537 (2008) (summarizing and challenging the view that unauthorized uses tend to weaken or replace a mark's association with a product, citing research showing "exposure to near variants or uses in other contexts makes the trademark more familiar and thus more easily retrieved from memory," much as "Tiffany's-the-restaurant may make us think of Tiffany'sthe-jeweler when we are at lunch thinking of gifts for Mother's Day").
47. And by "I collected," I mean my research assistants did all the hard work. 48. The complete list of cases we collected is available on request. 49. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 674 F. App 'x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2016 ) (affirming summary judgment for defendant maker of "My Other Bag" referencing Louis Vuitton bag without explicitly assessing whether Louis Vuitton was, as it must be for federal dilution statute to apply, famous); Louis Nonetheless, three things stand out. First, famous mark owners seem to be the only ones targeting parodies. Second, only a minority of famous mark owners in my study filed any claims against parodies at all. Many famous brands, even those who do plenty of enforcement, sue only traditional infringers or counterfeiters. That hasn't prevented their marks from being declared famous. Third, even famous mark owners who do target parodies bring only a small fraction of their suits against parodies, meaning stopping parodies isn't their ordinary form of policing.
All of this suggests that encouraging famous mark owners to celebrate (or at least tolerate) parodies, satire, and other expressive uses is likely to be effective in targeting the worst cases of trademark overreach. Companies don't need to target parodies or other expressive uses to survive or to thrive.
The change I propose is simple: Courts should consider the existence, number, and prominence of unauthorized parodies, satires, or other expressive and referential uses of a mark directed at the general public as evidence tending to show that the mark is famous for both dilution and likelihood of confusion purposes, and the absence of such uses as tending to show that the mark is not famous and not as strong.
50
Considering parodies as a factor favoring fame is straightforward to do under the judicially created likelihood of confusion test, which considers the strength and renown of the mark in assessing confusion. It is also straightforward under the existing dilution statute, which provides that "[i]n determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors." 51 The existence of expressive and referential uses specifically seems relevant to the "extent . . . of advertising and publicity of the mark . . . by . . . third parties," one of the elements for fame. 52 My proposal should encourage trademark lawyers to advise their clients to let such uses be. Trademark owners don't need to police expressive uses even today, and my approach would give them a reason not to.
We could go further, making the existence of parodies or expressive uses a requirement for fame. That would have some advantages, including changing the incentives of companies that are unquestionably famous. But that stronger version would require Congress to change the dilution statute. 53 Indeed, one might worry about the opposite problemcompanies trying to encourage or fake parodies or other expressive uses to meet the new requirement of fame. Courts should ensure that the uses in question are independent and unauthorized. For my proposal to work, a company should not be able to point to expressive uses of its work if it also sues or threatens those uses. Indeed, suing expressive users should probably disqualify the company from relying on expressive uses to prove fame altogether. 54 It certainly shouldn't be able to both try to shut down a parody or nominative use and also be able to point to that use as evidence of fame. Requiring that the expressive uses be truly independent may also help avoid a related problem-the assumption that everything requires a license and that the "safe" thing to do is get one even for uses the law expressly permits.
55
My proposal won't prevent all trademark overreach by any means. Some companies just don't like being made fun of, and they may continue to threaten suit whether the law supports them or not. So it may make sense to combine this proposal with other efforts to punish trademark overreach 56 to make clearer that these uses are lawful. 57 But if the goal is to change trademark owner behavior, giving them an affirmative reason to tolerate parodies and other expressive uses-and giving their lawyers a reason to counsel restraint 58 -is a logical way to get there. 59 even without dilution traditional trademark owners will seek fame, and we can use that desire to achieve social good. 54. Some rare suits against expressive uses might have merit, and those should not be disqualifying.
55. See Gibson, supra note 15, at 884, 907-08, 912-27 (examining how trademark owners' "rights" snowball when others believe it is "[b]etter [to be] safe than sued"); cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004) (describing "the permission culture that our law has produced" in copyright).
56. See supra text accompanying note 36 (citing other scholars who suggest legal sticks, social shame, and other remedies).
57. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 4, at 474 (arguing for positive doctrinal reforms to increase clarity and predictability given that current confusion leaves "would-be parodists vulnerable to threats of legal action by trademark holders"); McGeveran, supra note 9, at 49 (making a similar point about the problem of uncertainty and recommending "simpler affirmative defenses that reduce uncertainty and allow for quick adjudication").
58. On the role of lawyers in encouraging or restraining client impulses to attack uses they dislike, see Sheff, supra note 18, at 882. 59. As Glynn Lunney has observed, trademark law often moves in the wrong direction because rules that promote competition generally hurt the self-interest of repeat players in trademark cases, who want to capture rents by excluding competition. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark's Judicial De-Evolution:
CONCLUSION
Trademark owners often threaten parodists, satirists, and others who make lawful expressive uses of their marks, offering the rationale that they must police their mark against infringement or lose it. But they shouldn't. The law doesn't require policing such uses. Parody, criticism, and being part of the cultural conversation come with the territory of fame. The law should reflect that by treating the existence of those referential uses as indicating that the trademark is strong. By doing so, the law can help align the incentives of trademark owners with good public policy.
Why Courts Get Trademark Cases Wrong Repeatedly, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1195 REV. (2018 . Giving trademark owners an incentive to align their behavior with good social policy might help to break that cycle.
